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ABSTRACT
Pinning Down the Value of Statistical Life*
Our research addresses fundamental long-standing concerns in the compensating wage
differentials literature and its public policy implications: the econometric properties of
estimates of the value of statistical life (VSL) and the wide range of such estimates from
about $0.5 million to about $21 million. We address most of the prominent econometric
issues by applying panel data, a new and more accurate fatality risk measure, and
systematic selection of panel estimator in our research. Controlling for measurement error,
endogeneity, individual heterogeneity, and state dependence yields both a reasonable
average level and narrow range for the estimated value of a statistical life of about $5.5–$7.5
million.
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1. Introduction
The value of statistical life (VSL) concept based on econometric estimates of wagefatality risk tradeoffs in the labor market is well established in the economics literature.
The method provides the yardstick that the U.S. Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) requires agencies to use in valuing fatality risks reduced by regulatory programs.1
More recently, VSL estimates have also provided the basis for assessing the mortality
costs of the Iraq war (Wallsten and Kosec 2005, Bilmes and Stiglitz 2006).
Notwithstanding the wide use of the VSL approach, there is still concern over excessively
large/small estimates and wide range of the estimates for VSL. One approach to the
dispersion of VSL estimates that has been used by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency has been to rely on meta analyses of the labor market VSL literature. Our
research demonstrates how using the best available data and econometric practices pins
down the estimated VSL to a greater degree of refinement than in previous studies.
Our paper works within the econometrically familiar framework of the hedonic
wage equation used in the value of statistical life literature. For worker i (i = 1,…,N) in
industry j (j = 1,…,J) and occupation k (k = 1,…,K) at time t (t = 1,…,T) the hedonic
tradeoff between the wage and risk of fatality is

ln wijkt = α 0i + α1π jkt + X ijkt β + δ t + uijkt ,

(1)

where ln wijkt is the natural log of the hourly wage rate, and πjkt is the industry and
occupation specific fatality rate; Xijkt is a vector containing dummy variables for the
worker’s one-digit occupation (and industry in some specifications), region of residence,
plus the usual demographic variables: worker education, age, race, marital status, and
1

See U.S. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis (Sept. 17, 2003).
Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf.
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union status. Finally, δ t is a vector of time effects, and uijkt is an error term allowing an
individual-specific effect plus conditional heteroskedasticity and within industry by
occupation autocorrelation.2 Our research will subsequently expand the structure
summarized by equation (1) in a variety of ways, many of which will exploit the
capabilities of panel data by using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics in conjunction
with fatality risk measures that vary by year.
The apparent instability of the labor market VSL estimates has generated a series
of prominent econometric controversies reviewed by Viscusi and Aldy (2003). The
underlying hedonic model for equation (1) is that it traces out the locus of labor market
equilibria involving the offer curves of firms and the supply curves of workers. Many of
the most salient concerns involve the fatality risk variable, which ideally should serve as
a measure of the risk beliefs of workers and firms for the particular job. Broadly defined
risk measures, such as those pertinent to one’s industry or general occupation, may
involve substantial measurement error. There have been concerns regarding the potential
endogeneity of the job risk measure as well as state dependence. Equation (1) may also
omit important characteristics of the job or the worker, leading to omitted variables bias.
Here we will exploit the capabilities of a very refined risk measure defined over time and
by occupation and industry, coupled with panel data on workers’ labor market decisions,

2

The econometric structure in (1) is different than Brown’s (1980) panel data model where the job risk
variable was the same in all years and was given by the 1967 Society of Actuaries data, which provided
information on overall mortality risks for people in 37 relatively high risk occupational groups and
produced a VSL of only about $1.9 million. Moreover, the time variation in risk in his model arose from
changes in occupation over time. In contrast, our research uses a highly refined fatality risk measure for
720 industry-occupation cells for which there is variation across time as well as variation that arises as
workers change either their occupation or industry. Finally, we adopt a parametric specification of the
regression model representing hedonic equilibrium in (1) for comparison purposes with the existing
literature. An important emerging line of research is how more econometrically free-form representations
of hedonic labor markets facilitates identification of underlying fundamentals, which would further
generalize estimates of VSL (Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim 2004).
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to resolve many of the most prominent issues in the hedonic labor market literature. Our
focus is on the average VSL across a broad sample of workers and will consequently not
explore emerging concerns regarding the heterogeneity of VSL by age and other personal
characteristics.
We devote particular attention to the measurement error issue emphasized by
Black and Kniesner (2003) and Ashenfelter (2006). While we do not have information on
subjective risk beliefs, we will use very detailed data on objective risk measures.
Published industry risk beliefs are strongly correlated with subjective risk values3 and we
will follow the standard practice of matching to workers in the sample an objective risk
measure. Where we differ from most previous studies is the pertinence of the risk data to
the worker’s particular job, and ours is the first study to account for the variation of the
more pertinent risk level within the context of a panel data study.
We address the pivotal issue of measurement error in several ways. The fatality
risk variable is not by industry or occupation alone, as is the norm in almost all previous
studies, but is a refined measure based on 720 industry-occupation cells. We use not only
one-year but also three-year averages to reduce the influence of random year-to-year
fluctuations.4 Because the fatality rate data are available by year, workers in our panel
who do not change jobs can have a different fatality risk in different years. In contrast,
the only previous panel-based labor market VSL study used the same occupational risk
measure for 37 narrowly defined high risk occupations for all years, so that all possible
variation in risk was restricted to job changers (Brown 1980). Our research also explores

3

See Viscusi and Aldy (2003) for a review.
The only previous use of the fatality rate data at our level of disaggregation and for different periods of
time is in Viscusi (2004). Kniesner, Viscusi, and Ziliak (2006) also used the 720 cell measure but not the
multi-year averages.
4
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using adjacent year first differences as well as long differences, for which the influence
of measurement error should be less pronounced. We also examine how instrumental
variable estimates for each approach attenuates measurement error and endogeneity bias.
Finally, our dynamic first-difference estimates make it possible to include longer-run
worker adaptations to changes in their job risk level that may occur if they are not
perfectly informed about the risk initially.
Many studies have noted that potential biases in VSL estimates arise due to
possible omitted variables, such unmodeled worker productivity and safety-related
productivity.5 We infer the role of omitted variables through a variety of estimation
approaches, most of which exploit the capabilities of our large panel data set. Fixed effect
models sweep out the individual effects for both the adjacent year differences and the
long differences. In each instance, we use the pertinent instrumental variables estimator,
following Griliches and Hausman (1986). Our work also distinguishes job movers from
job stayers. We find that most of the variation in risk and most of the evidence of positive
VSLs stems from people changing jobs across occupations or industries possibly
endogenously rather than from variation in risk levels over time in a given job setting.
Our econometric refinements using panel data have a substantial effect on the
estimated VSL levels. They reduce the estimated VSL by more than 75 percent from the
implausibly large cross-section PSID-based VSLs of $18–$21 million. We demonstrate
how careful econometric practice narrows the estimated value of a statistical life from

5

Hwang, Reed, and Hubbard (1992) hypothesize that unobserved worker productivity biases VSL estimates
downwards. Viscusi and Hersch (2001) examine safety-related productivity, but do not offer any
directional hypothesis regarding the induced bias. Shogren and Stamland (2002) theorize that unobservable
worker skill in promoting safety leads VSL estimates to be too high, but their result stems from analysis of
infra-marginal workers who will not be captured in market evidence.
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about $0.5–$21 million (Viscusi and Aldy 2003) to only about $5.5–$7.5 million, which
greatly clarifies the choice of the proper VSL to be used in policy evaluations.
2. Panel Data Econometric Framework

Standard panel-data estimators permitting latent worker-specific heterogeneity
through person-specific intercepts in (1) are the deviation from time-mean (within)
estimator and the time-difference (first-differences) estimator. The fixed effects include
all person-specific time-invariant differences in tastes and all aspects of productivity,
which may be correlated with the regressors in X. The two estimators yield identical
results when there are two time periods and when the number of periods converges
towards infinity. With a finite number of periods (T > 2), estimates from the two different
fixed-effects estimators can diverge due to possible non-stationarity in wages,
measurement error, or model misspecification (Wooldridge 2002). Because wages from
longitudinal data on individuals have been shown to be non-stationary in other contexts
(MaCurdy 1982; Abowd and Card 1989), we adopt the preferred first-difference model as
a baseline.
The first-difference model eliminates any time-invariant effect by estimating the
changes over time in hedonic equilibrium
Δ ln wijkt = α1Δπ jkt + ΔX ijkt β + δt + Δuijkt ,

(2)

where Δ refers to the first-difference operator and δt is a re-normalized vector of time
dummies (Weiss and Lillard 1978).
The first-difference model could exacerbate errors-in-variables problems relative
to the within model (Griliches and Hausman (1986). If the fatality rate is measured with a
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classical error, then the first-difference estimate of α̂1 may be attenuated relative to the
within estimate. An advantage of the regression specification in (2), which considers
intertemporal changes in hedonic equilibrium outcomes, arises because we can use socalled wider (2+ year) differences. If Δ ≥ 2 then measurement error effects are mitigated
in (2) relative to within-differences regression (Griliches and Hausman 1986). As
discussed in the data section below, we additionally address the measurement error issue
in the fatality rate by employing multi-year averages of fatalities. For completeness we
also note how the first-difference estimates compare to the within estimates.
Lillard and Weiss (1979) demonstrated that earnings functions may not only have
idiosyncratic differences in levels but also have idiosyncratic differences in growth. To
correct for wages that may not be difference stationary as implied by equation (2) we
estimate a double differenced version of (2) that is

Δ 2 ln wijkt = α1Δ 2π jkt + Δ 2 X ijkt β + δt + Δ 2uijkt ,

(3)


where Δ 2 = Δ t − Δt −1 , commonly known as the difference-in-difference operator, and δt
is a re-normalized vector of time dummies. We also estimate a dynamic version of (2) by
adding γΔ ln wijkt−1 to the right-hand side and using the first-difference instrumental
variables estimator recommended in Arellano (1989). As is standard in the dynamic panel
literature our dynamic estimator uses the two-period lagged level of the dependent
variable as an identifying instrument for the one-period lagged difference in the
dependent variable. The lagged dependent variable controls for additional heterogeneity
and serial correlation plus sluggish adjustment to equilibrium (state dependence). We
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therefore compare the estimated short-run effect, α̂1 , to the estimated long-run effect,

αˆ1 /(1 − γˆ ) , and their associated VSLs.
2.1 Comparison Estimators

If E[uijk | π jk , X ijk ] = 0 , which is the standard zero conditional mean assumption of
least squares regression, then OLS estimation of the hedonic equilibrium in (1) using
pooled cross-section time-series data is consistent. If the zero conditional mean
assumption holds, which is unlikely to be the case, then the two basic estimators
frequently employed with panel data, the between-groups estimator and the randomeffects estimator, will yield consistent coefficient estimates.
The between-groups estimator is a cross-sectional estimator using individuals’
time-means of the variables
ln wijk = α 1π jk + X ijk β + δ + uijk ,
with ln wijk =

(4)

1 T
∑ ln wijkt and other variables similarly defined. A potential advantage of
T t =1

the between-groups estimator is that measurement-error induced attenuation bias in
estimated coefficients may be reduced because averaging smoothes the data generating
process. Because measurement error affects estimates of the VSL (Black and Kniesner
2003; Ashenfelter 2006), the between-groups estimator is likely to provide improved
estimates of the wage-fatal risk tradeoff over OLS estimates of equation (1).
The random-effects model differs from the OLS model in (1) by specifying
components of the overall error as uijkt = μi + υijkt , where μi is person-specific and timeinvariant unobserved heterogeneity, and υijkt is an independently and identically
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distributed random error component. The random-effects estimator is a weighted average
of the between-groups variation and the within-groups variation.
Consistency of the random-effects estimator requires E[ μi | π jkt , X ijkt ] = 0 and

E[υijkt | π jkt , X ijkt ] = 0 . The first condition implies that the time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity is randomly distributed in the population. The implication is that selection
into possibly risky occupations and industries on the basis of unobserved productivity and
tastes is purely random across the population of workers. Although both the pooled least
squares and between-groups estimators remain consistent in the presence of random
heterogeneity, the random-effects estimator will be more efficient because it accounts for
person-specific autocorrelation in the wage process.
Finally, suppose that selection into a particular industry and occupation is not
random with respect to time-invariant unobserved productivity and risk preferences. In
the non-random selection case, estimates of VSL based on the pooled cross-section,
between-groups, or random-effects estimators will be biased and inconsistent; the IV
first-differences and double-differences estimators in equations (2) and (3) and the IV
dynamic first-difference estimator can be consistent despite non-random job switching.
2.2 Research Objective

The focal parameter of interest in each of the regression models we estimate is α̂1
, which is used in constructing estimates of the value of a statistical life. Accounting for
the fact that fatality risk is per 100,000 workers and that the typical work-year is about
2000 hours, the estimated value of a statistical life at the mean level of wages is
⎡ ∂wˆ ˆ
⎤
= α1 × w) × 2000 ×100, 000 ⎥ .
VSL = ⎢(
⎣ ∂π
⎦

(5)
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Although the VSL function in (5) can be evaluated at various points in the wage
distribution, most studies report only the mean effect. To highlight the differences in
estimates of the VSL with and without controls for unobserved individual differences, we
follow the standard convention of focusing on VSL in our estimates presented below.
Our primary objective is to examine how following systematic econometric practices for
panel data models reduces the estimated range and pins down VSL.
3. Data and Sample Descriptions

The main body of our data come from the 1993–2001 waves of the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID), which provides individual-level data on wages, industry and
occupation, and demographics. The PSID survey has followed a core set of households
since 1968 plus newly formed households as members of the original core have split off
into new families.
3.1 PSID Sample

The sample we use consists of male heads of household ages 18–65 who are in
the random Survey Research Center (SRC) portion of the PSID, and thus excludes the
oversample of the poor in the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) and the Latino
sub-sample. The male heads in our regressions (i) worked for hourly or salary pay at
some point in the previous calendar year, (ii) are not permanently disabled or
institutionalized, (iii) are not in agriculture or the armed forces, (iv) have a real hourly
wage greater than $2 per hour and less than $100 per hour, and (v) have no missing data
on wages, education, region, industry, and occupation.
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Beginning in 1997 the PSID moved to every other year interviewing. For
consistent spacing of survey response we use data from the 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, and
2001 waves. We do not require individuals to be present for the entire sample period; we
have an unbalanced panel where we take missing values as random events.6 Our sample
filters yield 2,106 men and 7,931 person-years. About 40 percent of the men are present
for all five waves (nine years); another 25 percent are present for at least four waves.
The focal variable from the PSID in our models of hedonic labor market
equilibrium is the hourly wage rate. For workers paid by the hour the survey records the
gross hourly wage rate. The interviewer asks salaried workers how frequently they are
paid, such as weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly. The interviewer then norms a salaried
worker's pay by a fixed number of hours worked depending on the pay period. For
example, salary divided by 40 is the hourly wage rate constructed for a salaried worker
paid weekly. We deflate the nominal wage by the personal consumption expenditure
deflator for 2001 base year. We then take the natural log of the real wage rate to
minimize the influence of outliers and for ease of comparison with others’ estimates.
The demographic controls in the model include years of formal education, a
quadratic in age, dummy indicators for region of country (northeast, north central, and
west with south the omitted region), race (white = 1), union status (coverage = 1), marital
status (married = 1), and one-digit occupation. Table 1 presents summary statistics.
3.2 Fatality Risk Measures

We use the fatality rate for the worker’s two-digit industry by one-digit
occupation group. We distinguished 720 industry-occupation groups using a breakdown
6

Ziliak and Kniesner (1998) show that if nonrandom attrition is present our differenced data models should
sweep it out along with the other time-invariant factors.
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of 72 two-digit SIC code industries and the 10 one-digit occupational groups. After
constructing codes for two-digit industry by one-digit occupation in the PSID we then
matched each worker to the relevant industry-occupation fatality risk. We constructed a
worker fatality risk variable using proprietary U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data from
the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) for 1992–2002.7
The CFOI provides the most comprehensive inventory to date of all work-related
fatalities. The CFOI data come from reports by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, workers’ compensation reports, death certificates, and medical examiner
reports. In each case there is an examination of the records to determine that the fatality
was in fact a job-related incident.
The underlying assumption in our analysis and almost the entire hedonic literature
more generally is that the subjective risk assessments by workers and firms can be
captured by objective measures of the risk. Workers and firms use available information
about the nature of the job and possibly the accident record itself in forming risk beliefs.
The models do not assume that workers and firms are aware of the published risk
measures at any point in time. Rather, the objective measures serve as a proxy for the
subjective beliefs. Previous research reviewed in Viscusi and Aldy (2003) has indicated a
strong correlation between workers’ subjective risk beliefs and published injury rates.
Because our fatality risk variable is by industry and by occupation, it will provide a much
more pertinent measure of the risk associated with a particular job than a more broadly
based index, such as the industry risk alone, which is the most widely used job risk
variable. For example, miners and secretaries in the coal mining industry face quite
7

The fatality data can be obtained on CD-ROM via a confidential agreement with the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Our variable construction procedure follows that in Viscusi (2004), which describes the
properties of the 720 industry-occupation breakdown in greater detail.
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different risks, so that taking into account the occupation as well as the industry as we do
here substantially reduces the measurement error in the fatality risk variable.
The importance of the industry-occupation structure of our risk variable is
especially great within the context of a panel data analysis. The previous panel study by
Brown (1980) used a time-invariant fatality risk measure for 37 relatively high risk
occupations. By using a fatality risk variable that varies over time and is defined for 720
industry-occupation groups, we greatly expand the observed variance in workers’ job
risks across different periods.
We construct two measures of fatal risk, which differ according to the numerator.
The first measure simply uses the number of fatalities in each industry-occupation cell.
The second measure uses a three-year average of fatalities surrounding each PSID survey
year (1992–1994 for the 1993 wave, 1994–1996 for the 1995 wave, and so on). The
denominator for each measure used to construct the fatality risk is the number of
employees for that industry-occupation group in survey year t. Both of our two measures
of the fatality risk are time-varying because of changes in both the numerator and the
denominator.8
We expect there to be less measurement error in the 3-year average fatality rates
relative to the annual rate because the averaging process will reduce the influence of
random fluctuations in fatalities as well as mitigate the small sample problems that arise
from many narrowly defined job categories. We also expect less reporting error in the
industry information than in the occupation information, so even our annual measure
should have less measurement error than if the worker’s occupation were the basis for
8

We used the bi-annual employment averages from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population
Survey, unpublished table, Table 6, Employed Persons by Detailed Industry and Occupation for 1993–
2001.
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matching (Mellow and Sider 1983, Black and Kniesner 2003). Table 1 lists the means
and standard deviations for both fatality risk measures. The sample mean fatality risk for
the annual measure is 5.7/100,000. As expected, the variation in the annual measure
exceeds that of the 3-year average.
Our research also avoids a problem plaguing past attempts to estimate the wagefatal risk tradeoff with panel data. If the fatality rate is an aggregate by industry or
occupation the within or first-difference transformation leaves little variation in the
fatality risk measure to identify credibly the fatality parameter. Most of the variation in
aggregate fatal risk is of the so-called between-groups variety (across occupations or
industries at a point in time) and not of the within-groups variety (within either
occupations or industries over time). Although cross-group variation exceeds withingroup variation (Table 2), the within variation in our more disaggregate measures is
sufficiently large (about 50 percent of the between variation) so that it may be feasible to
identify the fatal risk parameter and VSL in our panel data models. Finally, we also
address the issue that cross-group variation in fatality risk may be generated by
endogenous job switching.
4. Wage Equation Estimates

Although we suppress the coefficients for ease of presentation, each regression
model we use controls for a quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region,
marital status, union status, race, one-digit occupation, and year effects. Because of the
substantial heterogeneity of jobs in different occupations, the regressions include a set of
one-digit occupation dummies. The equations do not include industry dummy variables
as well because doing so would introduce substantial multicollinearity with respect to the
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fatality risk variable, which involves matching workers to fatality risk based on their
industry and occupation. Reported standard errors are clustered by industry and
occupation and are also robust to the relevant heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
Note that our first-difference regressions automatically net out the influence of industry
and other job characteristics that do not change over time, and the double-difference
regressions net out additional trending factors.
Because our primary focus is on the panel estimates, we do not include variables
that exhibit little variation across the time periods. Because few workers move out of
state, we do not include a workers’ compensation variable. Studies that have included
workers’ compensation generally use a variable based on the state’s maximum benefit
level, which exhibits little variation for our panel sample.
4.1 Focal Estimates from Panel Data

The baseline first-difference estimates from equation (2) appear in Table 3. The
results are our basic attempt to address systematically not only latent heterogeneity and
possibly trended regressors, but also measurement error. Comparing estimates both down
a column and across a row reveals the effect of measurement error. The results are
reasonable from both an econometric and economic perspective and provide the
comparison point for our core research issue, which is how badly VSL can be misrepresented if certain basic econometric issues are mis-handled.
The VSL implied by the coefficient for the annual fatality rate in Table 3 using the
sample mean wage of $21 is $6.1 million. We emphasize that a novel aspect of our
research is that it helps clarify the size of possible measurement error effects. If
measurement error in fatality risk is random it will attenuate coefficient estimates and
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should be reduced by letting the fatality rate encompass a wider interval. Compared to
VSL from the more typical annual risk measure, the estimated VSL in Table 3 is about 20
percent larger when fatality risk is a three-year average. The last two columns of Table 3
report the results for widest possible differences ( ln w2001 − ln w1993 ) as well as differencein-differences from equation (3), which should remove possible spurious estimated
effects from variables that are not difference stationary. The main message from Table 3
is that correcting for measurement error enlarges estimated VSL, and that even for the
relatively basic panel models using differencing, the range for VSL is not large, $5.8–$7.6
million.
An issue seldom addressed in panel wage equations producing VSL is endogeneity
of the fatality change regressor, which may result from dynamic decisions workers make
to change jobs (Solon 1986, 1989; Spengler and Schaffner 2006). Some changes in
fatality risk will occur because of within industry-occupation cell changes and others will
occur because workers switch industry-occupation cells. Within the context of potentially
hazardous employment, much of the mobility stems from workers learning about the
risks on the job and then quitting if the compensating differential is insufficient given that
information (Viscusi 1979). Within the context of multi-period Bayesian decisions, this
desire to switch does not require that workers initially underestimated the risk, as
imprecise risk beliefs can also generate a greater willingness to incur job risks than is
warranted by the mean risk level. Interestingly, for the job changers in our sample, 55
percent switch to lower fatality risk jobs and 45 percent switch to higher fatality risk jobs
so that on balance there is some effort to sort into safer employment.

17
We examine the practical importance for panel based estimation in Table 4, where
we stratify the data by whether Δπt is due to within or between cell changes, including
immediately before and after a worker changes cell. The main econometric contribution
to compensating differentials for fatality risk comes from workers who generate
differences in risk over time by switching industry-occupation cells. The difference in
estimated VSL in Table 4 comes from the fact that σ π2t is at least 6 times larger for
switchers (see Table 2). There is too little within-cells variation to reveal much of a
compensating differential. More important, because so much of the variation producing
the wage differential in Table 3 comes from job changers, and the variation for switchers
may be related to wages, it is important to treat Δπ as endogenous.
The estimated range for VSL narrows even further when we allow for endogeneity
and instrument the change in fatality risk. The instrumental variables regressions in Table
5 control for both classical measurement errors and endogeneity. We limit the focus to
the annual fatality rate so as to have enough lagged fatality and fatality differences as
instruments.9 The main result is a very narrow range of estimated VSL, $5.6–$5.7 million
when we instrument the annual change in fatality risk.
Table 6 presents our final focal panel results from dynamic first-difference
regressions. The short-run effects from the dynamic model appear in column 1 and the
long-run (steady state) estimates appear in column 2. Note that our first-differences
estimator focuses on changes in wages in response to changes in risk. The mechanism by
which the changes will become reflected in the labor market hinges on how shifts in the

9

The instrument set we use is standard and well-established in the econometric literature on dynamic panel
models and will not be discussed further here. The interested reader should consult Arellano (1989) for
elaboration.
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risk level will affect the tangencies of the constant expected utility loci with the market
offer curve. To the extent that the updating of risk beliefs occurs gradually over time,
which is not unreasonable because even release of the government risk data is not
contemporaneous, one would expect the long-run effects on wages of changes in job risk
to exceed the short-run effects. Limitations on mobility will reinforce a lagged influence
(state dependence). As one would then expect, the steady state estimates of VSL after the
estimated three-year adjustment period in the results in Table 6 are larger than the shortrun estimates. The difference between the short-run and long-run VSL is about $7–8
million versus $10–11 million. Again, the range of VSL estimates is not wide when panel
data are used with state-of-the-art estimators appropriate for the issues of endogeneity,
measurement error, latent heterogeneity and possible state dependence.
4.2 Comparison Results From Cross-Section Estimators

Table 7 presents the comparison models, which flesh out the most salient
econometric issues when compared to the focal results from Tables 3–6 just presented.
One problematic result in the literature is the regularly occurring large value for
VSL when the PSID is used as a cross-section (Viscusi and Aldy 2003). Notice that the
cross-section estimators in columns 1 and 2 produce large implied VSLs, which also have
a much numerically larger range than the panel estimates, $16–22 million.
In contrast, column 3 of Table 7 reports estimates from the panel random-effects
estimator. Recall that the random-effects estimator accounts for unobserved
heterogeneity, which is assumed to be uncorrelated with observed covariates. It is fairly
common in labor-market research to reject the assumption of no correlation between
unobserved heterogeneity and observed covariates; we find a similar rejection here. This
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implies that the simple fixed effects within estimator in the last column is preferred over
the simple random effects estimator, with an estimated VSL of about $5.5 million.
Allowing for the possibility of unobserved productivity and preferences for risk, even if it
is improperly assumed to be randomly distributed in the population, reduces the
estimated VSL by up to 75 percent relative to a model that ignores latent heterogeneity
(the pooled least squares estimates). The difference in estimated VSL with versus without
latent individual heterogeneity in the model is consistent with the theoretical prediction in
Shogren and Stamland (2002) that failure to control for unobserved skill results in a
potentially substantial upward bias in the estimated VSL. Taking into account the
influence of individual heterogeneity implies that, on balance, unobservable personspecific differences in safety-related productivity and risk preferences are a more
powerful influence than unobservable productivity generally, which Hwang, Reed, and
Hubbard (1992) hypothesize to have the opposite effect.
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications

Obtaining reliable estimates of compensating differential equations has long been
challenging because of the central roles of individual heterogeneity and state dependence
in affecting both the market offer curve and individual preferences. The often conflicting
influence of different unobservable factors has led to competing theories with predictions
of different direction. The first-difference estimation results reported here use more
refined fatality risk measures than employed in earlier studies, making it possible to
control for measurement errors and workplace safety endogeneity when examining the
wage-fatality risk tradeoff. Comparison of the various first-difference results with various
cross-section estimates implies that controlling for latent worker-specific heterogeneity
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reduces the estimated VSL by up to 75 percent and narrows greatly the VSL range to
about $5.5–$7.5 million.
The wide variation of VSL estimates in the literature also has generated concern
that underlying econometric problems may jeopardize the validity of those estimates. The
range for VSL in the existing literature is extremely wide, from $0.5 million to $21
million. Previous studies using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics have often yielded
extremely high VSL estimates around $20 million. Earlier research did not control for the
host of econometric problems we address here. The econometrically most general firstdifference estimates we report range from $5.5 million to $7.5 million.
Narrowing VSL as we do here has substantial benefits for policy evaluation. In its
Budget Circular A4 (Sept. 17, 2003), the U.S. Office of Management and Budget requires
that agencies indicate the range of uncertainty around key parameter values used in
benefit-cost assessments. Attempting to bound the VSL based on a meta analysis
produces a wide range of estimates for $0.5 to $21 million. Moreover, there is always the
issue of what studies should be included in the meta analysis given the differences in data
sets, specifications, and study quality. As a consequence of the associated
indeterminacies, agencies often have failed to provide any boundaries at all to the key
VSL parameter in their benefit assessments.
The advantage of using our VSL range in policy assessments can be illustrated
using Figure 1. Using VSL estimates from the previous literature, policies with a cost per
life saved of $500,000 or less are desirable, those with a cost per life saved over $21
million fail a benefit-cost test, and the desirability of policies in the intermediate range is
unclear. Based on our results, denoted by KVWZ, policies with a cost per life saved at or
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below $5.5 million are in the acceptable range, those with a cost per life saved above $7.5
million fail a benefit-cost test, and policies in the intermediate range have unclear
economic desirability. For a hypothetical distribution of policies indicated by the bell
shaped curve in Figure 1 with a mean VSL of $10 million, it is clear that the range of
indeterminacy is greatly reduced by application of our VSL range.
The implications of this hypothetical example are also borne out for the
distribution of U.S. health and safety regulations. Using the widely cited estimates from
the U.S. Office of Management and Budget cited by Breyer (1993), among others, and
updating the values to $2001, illustrates the tremendous reduction of policy uncertainty
achievable by application of our estimates. Applying the meta analysis VSL range, 10
policies pass a benefit-cost test, 20 fail a benefit-cost test, and 23 are in the indeterminate
zone. Using our estimated VSL range, the distributions becomes 27 policies that clearly
pass a benefit-cost test, 25 that fail a benefit-cost test, with only 1 policy in the
indeterminate range. Our narrowing of the acceptable cost-per-life-saved range greatly
reduces the range of indeterminacy and is of substantial practical consequence given the
actual distribution of regulatory policy performance.
From a more conceptual standpoint, our research has resolved the econometric
issues giving rise to the very high/low levels and wide ranges of published VSL estimates.
The disparate results in previous studies may reflect the influence of omitted
unobservable effects, among other repairable econometric specification errors. Failure to
address the underlying econometric issues may have produced continuing controversy in
the economics literature over the hedonic methodology and unduly muddled the policy
debate over the use of VSL estimates in benefit calculations for government policies.
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Table 1: Selected Summary Statistics

Real Hourly Wage
Log Real Hourly Wage
Age
Marital Status (1=Married)
Race (1=White)
Union (1=member)
Years of Schooling
Live in Northeast
Live in Northcentral
Live in South
Live in West

Mean
21.058
2.881
40.895
0.820
0.764
0.230
13.585
0.177
0.288
0.372
0.163

Standard
Deviation
13.352
0.570
8.450
0.384
0.425
0.421
2.216
0.382
0.453
0.483
0.370

One-Digit Industry Groups:
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation and Public Utilities
Wholesale and Retail Trade
Fire, Insurance, and Real Estate
Business and Repair Services
Personal Services
Entertainment and Professional Services
Public Administration

0.008
0.106
0.259
0.109
0.130
0.045
0.066
0.009
0.169
0.098

0.087
0.308
0.438
0.311
0.337
0.208
0.248
0.097
0.375
0.297

One-Digit Occupation Groups:
Executive and Managerial
Professional
Technicians
Sales
Administrative Support
Services
Precision Production Crafts
Machine Operators
Transportation
Handlers and Labors

0.187
0.162
0.058
0.032
0.066
0.086
0.207
0.078
0.080
0.045

0.390
0.368
0.234
0.177
0.248
0.280
0.405
0.268
0.272
0.208

Annual Fatality Rate (per 100,000)
3-Year Fatality Rate (per 100,000)

5.704
5.565

8.973
8.414

Number of Men = 2,106
Number of Person Years = 7,931
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Table 2: Between and Within Group Variation for Industry by
Occupation Fatality Rates

Overall
Variance

Between
Group
Variance

Within
Group
Variance

80.519

52.484

28.035

70.801

50.298

20.503

Never Change Industry-Occupation
Annual Fatality Rate
(per 100,000)
3-Year Fatality Rate
(per 100,000)

75.696

70.032

5.664

71.667

69.452

2.215

Ever Change Industry-Occupation
Annual Fatality Rate
(per 100,000)
3-Year Fatality Rate
(per 100,000)

82.574

45.031

37.543

70.439

42.164

28.275

Only When Change Industry-Occupation
Annual Fatality Rate
(per 100,000)
3-Year Fatality Rate
(per 100,000)

88.309

53.274

35.035

71.669

49.001

22.668

Annual Fatality Rate
(per 100,000)
3-Year Fatality Rate
(per 100,000)
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Table 3: First-Difference Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff

Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)

Original Static
First Difference
Estimates

First-Difference
Estimator for
2001minus1993

Difference in
Differences
Estimator

1.4425
(0.4175)

1.6646
(1.3584)

1.5553
(0.5091)

6.1

7.0

6.6

1.7531
(0.5276)

1.3834
(1.4344)

1.7979
(0.6142)

7.4

5.8

7.6

Number of Observations
5242
1255
3373
Notes: Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls for a
quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, race, onedigit occupation, and year effects. To construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in the
table are divided by 1,000.
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Table 4: Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff by Job Change Status
Static First-Difference

First-Difference
Estimator for 2001
minus 1993

0.3306
(1.2132)

-0.1188
(2.8783)

1.4

−0.5

-0.5653
(2.2522)

2.1041
(3.9626)

Implied VSL ($Millions)

−2.4

8.9

Number of Person-Years
Ever Change Industry-Occupation
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000

1493

330

1.5483
(0.4473)

1.9423
(1.4353)

6.5

8.2

1.8660
(0.5352)

1.4322
(1.5141)

7.9

6.0

3749

925

1.7252
(0.4996)

1.7662
(1.4580)

7.3

7.4

2.0045
(0.5604)

1.3121
(1.5303)

8.4

5.5

Never Change Industry-Occupation
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
Number of Person-Years
Only When Change Industry-Occupation
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)

Number of Person-Years
1033
745
Notes: Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors for the pooled times series
cross-section estimator and the first difference estimator are robust to heteroskedasticity and
within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls for a quadratic in age, years
of schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, race, one-digit occupation, and
year effects. To construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by
1,000.
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Table 5: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff

Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)

First-Difference IV
Estimator, t−1 and t−3
Fatality as Instruments

First-Difference IV
Estimator, Lag
Differenced Fatality as
Instrument

1.3377
(0.6676)

1.3417
(0.6677)

5.6

5.7

First Stage Results
t−1 fatality rate

0.6528
(0.0114)

t−3 fatality rate

−0.6512
(0.0113)

(t−1 rate) − (t−3 rate)

R2

0.6520
(0.0103)
0.54

0.54

Number of Observations
5242
5242
Notes: Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls
for a quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status,
race, one-digit occupation, and year effects. First stage regressions include all exogenous
explanatory variables in addition to the noted instruments. To construct the VSL using
equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by 1,000.
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Table 6: Dynamic First Difference Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff
Dynamic First-Difference
Estimates
with lag wage instrumented

Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)

Short-Run
Effect

Long-Run Effect

1.7583
(0.5390)

2.4825
[0.0024]

7.4

10.5

1.8154
(0.6629)

2.5623
[0.0088]

7.6

10.8

Number of Observations
3373
Notes: Standard errors are recorded in parentheses and p-values of the null hypothesis that the long-run
effect is zero are recorded in square brackets. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and within
industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Models control for a quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators
for region, marital status, union status, race, one-digit occupation, and year effects. One and two year lags of
the independent variables, except for the fatality rates, are included as instruments for the lag wage. To
construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by 1,000.
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Table 7: Cross Section and Panel Data Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff

Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)

Pooled Cross
Section Time
Series
Estimator

BetweenGroup
Estimator

RandomEffects
Estimator

Fixed-Effects
Estimator

3.8702
(0.9972)

5.2443
(1.5944)

1.7401
(0.5185)

1.2498
(0.5382)

16.3

22.1

7.3

5.3

4.3338
(1.0316)

5.0506
(1.5811)

2.0445
(0.6074)

1.3352
(0.6452)

18.3

21.3

8.6

5.6

Number of Observations
7928
2106
7928
7737
Notes: Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors for the pooled times series
cross-section estimator and the first difference estimator are robust to heteroskedasticity and within
industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls for a quadratic in age, years of
schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, race, one-digit occupation, and year
effects. To construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by 1,000.
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Figure 1: VSL Range and Program Evaluation
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